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SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY 




Within the first weeks of his administra-
tion, Spain’s prime minister-elect in 2004,
Socialist leader Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero,
redefined the country’s relationship with both
the United States and Europe. After eight years
of conservative rule under former Prime
Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who had prioritized
Spain’s relationship with the United States over
that with Europe, Zapatero announced plans to
restore strong ties to the European Union (EU).
Spain must belong to “the heart of Europe,”
Zapatero told one reporter following his elec-
tion win. (EU Business, Sept. 13, 2004) As I will
discuss in this article, Zapatero’s new plan for
Spanish foreign policy is characteristic of
Socialist ideals, which are intricately linked to
both the party’s development and internal evo-
lution. 
Since 1982, seven years after the death of
General Franco and four years after the formal
establishment of constitutional democracy, the
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and
the conservative Partido Popular (PP) have
dominated national politics in Spain. The
PSOE, led by Felipe Gonzalez, was first elected
in October 1982 and was re-elected on three
subsequent occasions — 1986, 1989, and 1993.
Power shifted hands in 1996 but returned to
the Socialists in 2004, this time led by Zapatero.
Founded in May 1879, the PSOE is the oldest
party in Spain and one of the oldest in Europe.
Traditionally, the party stands for the working
class and was largely inspired by Marx; howev-
er, within the past two decades it has deliber-
ately moved toward the center-left in an
attempt to widen its electoral appeal. (Newton
and Donaghy, p. 189)
On the other hand, the PP first gained
power in 1996 under the leadership of Aznar,
who was re-elected in 2000 and remained in
power until 2004. Unlike the PSOE, the center-
right party has modern origins. First called the
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Popular Alliance, the party was founded in 1976
as a loose coalition of seven right-wing groups.
After several poor performances in the elec-
tions, the party regrouped in 1989, adopted a
new name (Partido Popular), and resolved to
create a tightly structured party dedicated to
incorporating the three main political strands
of Spanish conservatism, liberalism, and
Christian democracy. (Newton and Donaghy, 
p. 200)
Though the parties have different origins
and naturally advocate opposite sides of the
political spectrum, Europe, specifically the EU,
has been crucial to the construction and devel-
opment of foreign policy for the Socialists and
conservatives alike. Following the death of
General Franco, who left Spain isolated as an
international pariah after 36 years of authori-
tarian rule, both Socialist and conservative lead-
ers openly desired EU membership (then the
EC — European Community). The EC was gen-
erally perceived as the means to a prosperous
economy, as well as a symbol of political
progress and an end to isolation. As a result of
these views, both parties were overwhelmingly
satisfied when Spain gained EC entry in January
1986. 
Despite their common enthusiasm for EC
membership, Socialist and conservative atti-
tudes toward Europe diverged as both the par-
ties and the country evolved. Broadly speaking,
Socialist beliefs about Europe corresponded
with existing EC policy and thus each enhanced
the other. (Torreblanca, p. 2) Conservative
beliefs about Europe, however, largely conflict-
ed with EC goals and practices, which caused
tension between the party and Europe to
spread. (Torreblanca, p. 2) Overall, these beliefs
contributed to the development of party prin-
ciples and help give context to Zapatero’s
Socialist shift.
This article considers the reasons for
Zapatero’s foreign policy shift, as well as the
ways it may affect Spain’s ability to assert its
power abroad and protect its interests within
the framework of the EU. It explores Socialist
and conservative identities in Spain to shed
light on the shift, which are based on history
and tradition, as well as the evolution of inter-
national perceptions of Spain and popular
Spanish attitudes toward Europe. In addition,
the article argues that Zapatero’s new policy
plan has the potential to benefit Spain and
increase its status within the EU. However, to
achieve such benefits, Zapatero must deliber-
ately assert Spain’s authority abroad, as Aznar
did, and resist pursuing a passive foreign poli-
cy agenda based on Socialist traditions and
principles from the past.
Spain’s History as an 
International Pariah
Spain’s history as an international pariah
resulted broadly from two historical legacies:
recogimiento and Franco’s opportunism. In
brief, recogimiento meant Spain’s recognition
of its own self-importance. The concept was
founded by a nineteenth century statesman,
Antonio Canovas del Castillo, and idealized iso-
lationism and encouraged Spaniards to feel
proud of being different. Franco’s regime,
which began in 1939, advanced the concept
until his death in 1975 by encouraging a
nationalistic identity in Spain based on the
myths of empire, language, statehood, and reli-
gion. (Torreblanca, p. 23) “Spain was not iso-
lated, the official propaganda argued, but self-
excluded from a world where two options
dominated: liberalism, whose individualism was
a dangerous source of corruption of Catholic
values and personal ethics, and Communism,
which was simply evil,” says Jose Torreblanca,
senior analyst for Real Instituto Elcano in
Spain. (Torreblanca, p. 23)
In addition to its history of self-exclusion,
Spain’s pariah status resulted from Franco’s
opportunism during World War II and the
immediate post-war years. The devastation
caused by civil war, 1936–1939, left Franco few
foreign policy options during World War II,
largely because of Spain’s war-damaged econo-
my and scarce resources. He sympathized with
the Axis powers and openly opposed the Allies;
yet he resisted pressure to commit troops to
battle and declared a policy of neutrality in the
opening days of war. The policy, however, was
not without ulterior motives. “It was as impor-
tant to Franco to gain international recognition
at the time of war, as a nationalist/Fascist leader,
as to distance himself from the Germans by pro-
claiming his neutrality and independence, in
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case the Germans lost the war,” says Benny
Pollack in The Paradox of Spanish Foreign
Policy. (Pollack, p. 5)
Franco shifted Spain’s policy of neutrality
to one of non-belligerency following Germany’s
early success, which suggested Spain’s full mil-
itary commitment to the Axis powers was near.
When the Allied powers regained control, how-
ever, Franco abandoned this policy and adopt-
ed a stance of “benevolent neutrality” toward
the Allies in hopes to gain their favor. Despite
this change in policy, liberated Europe and the
international community were quite eager to
punish the dictator for his opportunistic behav-
ior during the war and subsequently denied
Spain membership in the United Nations (UN)
at its conception in 1945. 
Ten years later, the UN approved Spain’s
membership — the culmination of a compli-
cated process of pressures prompted by Cold
War necessities. (Pollack, p. 24) United States
President Harry S. Truman worked especially
hard to build Spain’s international legitimacy
because he was anxious to create an alliance
against the Soviet Union. Similarly, United
States policy-makers and intelligence officers
worked to facilitate Spain’s integration into the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
(Pollack, p. 25) 
Europe’s policy approach, however, was
less pragmatic than Truman’s. Mistrust and
caution caused most European leaders to resist
Spanish integration even after Franco’s death
in 1975. As a result of their resistance, Spain
was slow to join the international community.
Between 1976 and 1978, however, Spain made
considerable progress toward consolidating
democracy and affecting political reform. For
example, on June 15, 1977, Spain held nation-
al elections for the first time in forty years.
Similarly, in December 1978 Spain established
its first democratic constitution since 1931 after
more than a year of cooperation among all the
major parties represented in Parliament.
(Newton and Donaghy, p. 5) Both events trig-
gered acceptance abroad and the start of Spain’s
return to the international community, a return
which culminated on January 1, 1986, when
Spain gained entry into the EC. 
Franco’s Legacy and Party Identities
in Spain
While both the Socialists, under the lead-
ership of Gonzalez, and the conservatives, led
by Aznar, advanced their post-Franco policies
within the same symbolic framework of seek-
ing international acceptance and appeal
(Torreblanca, p. 27), the parties had different
views of Europe based on different beliefs about
Franco and the legacy he left behind. To the
Socialists, Francoism is “a parenthesis in
Spanish history, an anomaly proving Spanish
backwardness, isolation temptations, and the
incapacity of its elite to modernize the coun-
try.” (Torreblanca, p. 25) To the conservatives,
however, Francoism is hailed as successful, seen
as establishing the socioeconomic basis which
would make democracy possible later on.
(Torreblanca, p. 25) These beliefs directly affect-
ed Socialist and conservative identities, as well
as the foreign policy goals of Gonzalez and
Aznar.
The Socialist party, on the one hand, was
influenced by the vision of European integra-
tion as an opportunity to modernize Spain. As
a result of this vision, “Europe” became an inte-
gral part of the party’s foundational identity,
causing post-Franco Socialists to show true
enthusiasm about EC/EU foreign policy coop-
eration and convergence. (Torreblanca, p. 24)
As Torreblanca says, the result was that in 1996,
after 14 years of Socialist rule and 10 years of
EC/EU membership, 
Spanish foreign policy had acquired
a clear EU profile: all the positions
Spain had adopted in areas such as
disarmament and non-proliferation,
multilateral trade and investment,
international financial cooperation,
human rights and democratization,
peace-keeping or global warming,
could only be understood in the
framework of Spanish membership
in the EU. (Torreblanca, p. 11)
According to Torreblanca, “As Gonzalez himself
put it, Europe had become ‘the frontier of our
ambitions,’ meaning that, in his view, Spaniards
could achieve little or nothing of their collec-
tive project beyond or without the EU.”
(Torreblanca, p. 25)
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On the other hand, Aznar and the conser-
vative PP were influenced by a different view of
Europe and therefore took a different approach
to integration. Like the Socialists, the party is
firmly committed to the EU. However, the con-
servatives generally favor the “Europe of
nations” concept rather than that of a “federal
Europe.” (Newton and Donaghy, p. 202) This
means that the party prefers the idea of the EU
as an intergovernmental organization where
each member-state retains its sovereign identi-
ty and exercises its national interests within the
EU’s framework. One (unidentified) political
leader from Aznar’s party exemplified this ideal
in an interview with Menendez-Alarcon, direc-
tor of the International Studies program at
Butler University and Assistant Professor of
Sociology. According to Menendez-Alarcon, the
leader said,
I support the idea of the European
Union in terms of agreements among
states, particularly on economic mat-
ters, defense, peace agreements, and
the fight against crime, but I think
we should try hard to keep our own
state and keep Spain as an indepen-
dent country with its own army 
and particular culture. (Menendez-
Alarcon, p. 340)
This concept opposes that of a federal Europe
where the EU as an institution acts as a supra-
national power and supercedes the general
interests and identities of its member-states. As
a result of this view, the conservative party is
equally committed to transatlantic ties and does
not advocate Europe as central to Spanish suc-
cess like the Socialists.
International Legitimacy and 
Its Effect on Foreign Policy
Just as Spanish history and party identi-
ties have affected the foreign policies of both
the Socialist and conservative governments,
each party’s policy agenda has also been affect-
ed by the degree to which the international
community has perceived Spain as a legitimate
and capable contender in foreign affairs. In
other words, Spain’s ability to promote its pol-
icy agenda within the framework of the EC/EU
has largely depended on its status and reputa-
tion within Europe, which was linked to its
progress and development as a democracy. That
said, Gonzalez had fewer opportunities than
Aznar to maneuver internationally and promote
Spanish interests abroad solely because he ruled
during Spain’s early years as an EC member-
state and therefore had little clout in EC affairs.
Foreign policy during Gonzalez’s Socialist
rule was therefore as much a product of the
times as it was a product of party identity and
history’s effect on party ideals. When Spain
entered the EC in 1986, Gonzalez had been in
power for almost four years, and Spain had been
formally established as a constitutional democ-
racy for almost eight. Yet at this time, and
despite concentrated efforts to promote eco-
nomic progress and modernize political insti-
tutions, other Europeans viewed Spain as a
backward, rural, and conservative society.
(Menendez-Alarcon, p. 334) Europeanization
thus became a prerequisite for having the EC
serve Spain’s national interests. (Torreblanca,
p. 15) This meant that Gonzalez, especially dur-
ing Spain’s early years as an EC member-state,
was largely confined to adopting European
standards when devising Spanish policy. The
effects of his confines are evident, for example,
in Spain’s policy on Latin America during the
1980s. In 1982, when Gonzalez first gained
power, Foreign Minister Fernando Moran
asserted that maintaining a “special relation-
ship” with Latin America would contribute to
Spain’s overall clout in international affairs and
boost its value to the EC and the United States.
Gonzalez, however, and Moran’s successor in
the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Fernandez
Ordonez (1985–1992), opted to assume the EC’s
policy on Latin America before seeking to lead
and manage Europe’s relationship with the
region. (Torreblanca, p. 12) This decision was
the direct result of Gonzalez’s awareness of the
workings of international politics. He knew that
Spain needed to gain trust and confidence inter-
nationally before he could assert Spanish inter-
ests abroad. Foreign policy under Gonzalez,
therefore, was intricately linked to the EC
because of history and party identity but also
because of the sheer timing of Socialist rule.
In 1996, when Aznar first gained power,
Spain’s political and economic climate was
completely different than when Gonzalez had
inherited it. As Torreblanca has said, “Spain’s
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foreign policy had suffered a radical transfor-
mation: a country that had not participated 
in either of the century’s world wars and 
which had not been a founding member of the
UN was now a full member of the internation-
al, Western and European community.”
(Torreblanca, p. 7) In addition, Spanish troops,
who had previously been seen fighting abroad
only in colonial wars, had participated in both
the Gulf War and twelve peacekeeping opera-
tions around the world (Torreblanca, p. 7),
which indicated Spain’s full and faithful com-
mitment to its international allies.
Spain’s economic transformation was
equally impressive. According to Menendez-
Alarcon, data provided by the Instituto Nacional
de Estadisticas in 1996 show that between 1985
and 1995 the Spanish economy grew three per-
cent per year on average and per capita income
increased by 41 percent overall. In addition, per
capita income rose from 66 percent of the EU
average in 1986 to 77 percent in 1995. As a
result of these changes that occurred pre-Aznar,
the conservative government had the ability to
immediately promote Spanish interests abroad,
whereas Gonzalez’s Socialists were compelled
to first gain credibility in international affairs. 
Changing Public Attitudes 
under Gonzalez
The Socialist and conservative policies
that were deeply rooted in history, and linked
to both party identity and international per-
ceptions of Spain, were partly affected by pub-
lic attitudes toward Europe as well. When
Gonzalez first gained power in 1982 and when
Spain joined the EC in 1986, few Spaniards
rejected the idea of membership. Overall,
Spaniards were content to become part of the
select club of developed and democratic
nations, having been isolated from Europe for
a half century, and looked forward to the struc-
tural and cohesion funds Spain would receive
from the EC. (Menendez-Alarcon, p. 333) Since
the early 1990s, however, support for the EU
has dwindled; this change in public attitudes
coincides with the Socialist-conservative power
shift in 1996 when Aznar won elections after 14
years of Gonzalez’s rule. 
According to Menendez-Alarcon, who cites
Eurobarometer public opinion polls, almost 
70 percent of Spaniards felt positive about
belonging to the EC at the end of the 1980s. By
1996, however, this proportion declined to 51
percent. Similarly, the proportion of people who
viewed membership as negative for Spain grew
from 9 percent in 1986 to 20 percent in 1997;
and the proportion of those who considered
membership neither negative nor positive
increased from 21 percent in 1986 to 26 per-
cent in 1997. In general, these changes in pub-
lic attitudes were the result of two things: eco-
nomic grievances and a growing concern over
the preservation of Spanish sovereignty and
national identity. 
In macroeconomic and purely financial
terms, membership in the EU has contributed
to Spain’s overall economic growth.
(Menendez-Alarcon, p. 335) “Indeed, if we
include in the analysis both the commercial
exchange and resources received by Spain from
the structural and cohesion funds,” says
Menendez-Alarcon, “there is a small net posi-
tive balance for 1986–1995.” (Menendez-
Alarcon, p. 225) Despite this, the public’s per-
ception of the effects of the EU on Spain’s
economy was poor: the difference between
those who expected EU effects on Spain’s econ-
omy to be good and those who considered them
to be bad was 40 percentage points in 1991 and
only 5 points in 1995. (Perez-Diaz, p. 127)
Similarly, the difference between those who
considered the effects of the EU on Spain’s job
market to be good and those who thought them
to be bad, which was negligible in 1991, went
down to minus 25 points in 1995. (Perez-Diaz,
pp. 127–28) The overall result of these attitudes
was a growing frustration with Gonzalez’s con-
stant support for Europe.
This frustration intensified when, during
the early- to mid-1990s, several key events
regarding Spain’s relations with the EU caused
a rise in nationalistic feelings among Spaniards.
Menendez-Alarcon cites several of these events.
He says:
In 1993, the Spanish government
hoped to obtain the headquarters 
of a relevant EU office such as 
the Environment Agency. Instead
Spain was assigned the Office for
Harmonization of the Internal
Market, a much less prestigious orga-
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nization. Again, in the second half of
1993 and early 1994, during the
negotiations for admission of the
Nordic countries, the EU accepted
none of Spain’s main propositions
regarding institutional reforms.
Then, in 1995, Spain was engaged in
a confrontation with Canada over
fishing rights; many respondents1
believe that Canada was able to
impose most of its conditions
because Spain could not obtain solid
backing from the EU. (Menendez-
Alarcon, pp. 227–28)
A renewed focus inward emerged as a result of
these events. Most Spaniards began viewing the
EU as a distant, top-down power in contrast to
local and national institutions, which were seen
as providing a more meaningful context for
social action and participation. (Menendez-
Alarcon, p. 338) In addition, by 1995, the pub-
lic usually ranked the national state first when
it came to a choice of where to place the center
of gravity of political decision-making, Spain or
the EU. (Perez-Diaz, p. 128)
In spite of these views, Gonzalez did little
to address the situation. In fact, according to
Perez-Diaz, “In the view of the critics, the
Spanish government was doing little more than
preaching the virtues of nominal convergence
of the European economies and repeating the
mantra, ‘we want to be among the core nations
of the European Union.’ ” (Perez-Diaz, p. 127)
In the end, Gonzalez’s relative lack of attention
to changing public attitudes about Europe con-
tributed to his defeat in 1996. For the purpose
of this article, however, it is important to see
how this shift in attitude coincided with the
start of conservative rule and thus how conser-
vative policy, like that of the Socialists, was part-
ly a product of its time. In Gonzalez’s Socialist
case, policy was limited by whether the inter-
national community perceived Spain as a legit-
imate and trustworthy contender in foreign
affairs. In Aznar’s conservative case, the reverse
occurred. Although conservative policy was not
necessarily limited by popular perceptions of
Europe, Aznar’s government was compelled to
take public attitudes into account when devis-
ing foreign policy. Fortunately for Aznar, tradi-
tional conservative views just so happened to
correspond to public attitudes toward Europe
at the time he was elected.
Aznar’s Conservative Shift and
Changes in International Affairs
As discussed in the sections above, foreign
policy under Aznar was affected by the same fac-
tors that shaped Gonzalez’s agenda and dictat-
ed Spanish relations with the EU and the United
States. First, Aznar’s conservative policies large-
ly resulted from his party’s identity and specif-
ic interpretation of Spanish history, particular-
ly of Franco’s regime. Second, Aznar’s policies,
like those of Gonzalez, were influenced by inter-
national perceptions of Spain, which affected
Spain’s overall clout in European and global
affairs. And third, foreign policy during Aznar’s
and Gonzalez’s rules was affected by popular
Spanish attitudes toward Europe, which
changed dramatically from the time Spain
gained EC entry in 1986 to the time Aznar
gained national power in 1996, and again from
the time Aznar gained power to the time his
party lost elections in 2004.
Generally speaking, each of these factors
caused Gonzalez to assume EC/EU policies 
as part of Spain’s own foreign agenda.
Paradoxically, these same factors, which took
on different characteristics during Aznar’s rule,
allowed the conservative leader to firmly assert
national interests abroad. Therefore, when
Aznar assumed office, he initiated policy based
on two broad goals: to make Spain more visible
at the international level and to make Spain
more respected within the EU. These goals were
carried out in three distinct ways. 
First, Aznar abandoned Spain’s European-
ist path to prioritize the country’s relationship
with Washington and the United States. This
change is best exemplified by Aznar’s public
support of the Anglo-American bombing of Iraq
in 1998, as well as his support for United States
president George W. Bush during the U.S.-led
1Menendez-Alarcon collected empirical data “based on
in-depth, semi-structured individual interviews conducted
in different regions of Spain in 1996, 1997, and 1998.”
(Menendez-Alarcon, 2000, p. 333) He used this technique
of research “to try to gather data on people’s perceptions
beyond the official declarations of leaders, as reported in
newspapers, and more in-depth information on perceptions
than the surveys generally offer.” (Menendez-Alarcon, p. 333)
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invasion of Iraq in 2001. In the first case, Aznar
was the sole Continental leader to support the
bombing while in the second he was one of few
European nations to join Bush in the preemp-
tive strike against Iraq.
Second, Aznar sought new, more prag-
matic alliances within Europe to strengthen
Spain’s political weight within the EU. This
approach to policy contrasted with that of his
predecessor, who had remained committed to
the Franco-German alliance, traditionally con-
sidered the engine of Europe, throughout his
14-year rule. Whereas Gonzalez had perceived
adherence to the Franco-German partnership
as automatically beneficial for Spain (Closa, 
p. 7), Aznar looked toward the axis with a more
critical eye. The conservative prime minister
therefore worked to promote himself as leader
of a Europe that no longer admitted to Franco-
German hegemony. (Lecha)
Third, Aznar maintained a liberal view of
socioeconomic integration in Europe which
opposed the federalizing initiatives of his pre-
decessor. According to Closa, Aznar’s main con-
tribution to socioeconomic reform was the
Strategy for Sustainable Development initiative
jointly presented with British Prime Minister
Tony Blair. The initiative rested on three pillars
including: (1) progress toward an economy and
a society based on knowledge, a pillar that
would be accomplished through the imple-
mentation of new R&D policies, structural eco-
nomic reform, and the completion of the sin-
gle market; (2) modernization of the European
social model based on new employment poli-
cies, greater investment in human capital, and
measures to prevent social exclusion; and (3)
stable economic growth secured by deregula-
tion and other economic reforms. (Closa, p. 8)
Each of these three policy reforms was
consistent with the conservative party’s tradi-
tional identity and specific interpretation of
Spanish history. Whereas the Socialist party
viewed Franco’s isolationism as a symbol of
backwardness and thus found solace in
Europeanizing national policy after the dicta-
tor’s death during Gonzalez’s rule, the conser-
vative party saw Francoism as contributing to
the socioeconomic basis of Spanish democra-
cy. As a result of this view, Aznar and the PP
have neither felt nor acted on the “need” to
assume EC/EU policy as perceived by Gonzalez
and the PSOE, and therefore pursued the
reforms described above.
In addition, two of the PP’s three broad
policy changes directly affected Spain’s status
in international affairs and political pull with-
in Europe. The first change, Aznar’s decision to
abandon Spain’s Europeanist path and priori-
tize ties to the United States, ultimately result-
ed in the emergence of an alliance with Bush
during the Iraq War that began in 2001.
According to the director of the European
Security Policy Training Course at the Geneva
Center for Security Policy, Julian Lindley-
French, this alliance allowed Spain to demon-
strate its close friendship with the world’s only
superpower and thus emerge as no longer a fol-
lower but as a co-leader in European affairs.
(Lindley-French, p. 3) “Iraq enabled Spain to
return to the top table of power at a key
moment in both European and transatlantic
politics,” Lindley-French says. This made it
“more difficult not just for France and Germany
to ‘lead’ Europe but also for Britain, France, and
Germany to exclude Spain from a tri-rectoire
should they reach an accommodation at some
time in the future.” (Lindley-French, p. 3) 
In addition, Aznar and the PP publicly
framed Spain’s alliance with the United States
as both privileged and necessary for Europe and
the continued cohesion of international affairs.
In 2003, Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs dur-
ing Aznar’s rule, Ana Palacio, expressed the
party’s perceived necessity of this link as it relat-
ed to international security and defense. She
said: 
From the beginning, the develop-
ment of the [European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP)] has been
based on two very clear principles: it
should complement NATO, and it
must preserve and reinforce the
transatlantic link. Spain remains
fully committed to cooperation
between NATO and the European
Union that avoids undesirable com-
petition and unnecessary duplication
of efforts. We believe that this part-
nership is of key importance for the
continuing effectiveness of both
organizations in crisis management.
(Palacio, p. 79)
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This public frame, in addition to Spain’s part-
nership with the United States during the Iraq
War, contributed to a gain in international pres-
tige during Aznar’s rule. In June 2001 Bush
helped seal this gain during a joint press con-
ference with Aznar at the Moncloa Palace in
Madrid. “Spain is a friend of the United States
and President Aznar is a friend of mine,” Bush
said during his opening remarks at the press
conference. “Spain is one of America’s most
reliable allies and one of the world’s most
dynamic societies. Spain has made one of
Europe’s most remarkable transitions to
democracy and prosperity. It is now the world’s
eighth largest industrial economy. Mr. Aznar,
you deserve a lot of credit.” (“Joint Press
Conference …,” p. 1) Bush’s recognition of
Spain as a friend and reliable ally publicly
asserted the country’s value to him and
America, and implied Spain’s value to the world.
The end result: Aznar seemingly achieved at
least one of the goals he set out to achieve at
the beginning of his administration — to make
Spain more visible at the international level. 
Aznar’s second broad policy change, the
decision to pursue practical alliances within the
EU as opposed to adhering to the Franco-
German lead, also contributed to a gain in
Spanish prestige abroad and an increase in
Spain’s political weight within Europe. This
gain is best exemplified by Aznar’s alliance with
Poland’s Leszek Miller at the December 2003
summit in Brussels. At the summit, Aznar and
Miller jointly refused to relinquish their voting
rights within the European Council as defined
by the Nice Treaty in 2000. According to the
treaty’s system of weighted votes, Spain and
Poland had almost the same number of votes as
member-states with much larger populations
including Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.
(Chislett, p. 1) According to the voting scheme
proposed at Brussels, however, which was based
on a qualified majority formula instead of a
weighted votes system, both countries would
have lost a great amount of effective power
within the EU. In the end, Aznar’s alliance with
Miller against the voting scheme proposed at
Brussels allowed the two leaders to paralyze
negotiations on the draft Constitution.
Likewise, the outcome of this alliance signaled
Spain’s ability to exercise its political weight
within the EU and served as a demonstration of
the country’s political clout within Europe.
These same two policy changes (strength-
ening ties to the United States and forming new,
more practical alliances within Europe) that
contributed to Spain’s overall gain in interna-
tional status and political weight within Europe
also contributed to an internal shift in public
attitudes about the EU and Spain’s role in pol-
itics abroad. Ironically, while Spain’s link to the
United States and its role in Iraq was in large
part the reason for the country’s increase in
prestige during Aznar’s rule, as argued above,
most public opinion polls conducted during
this time showed that a majority of Spaniards
maintained conflicting feelings about the
United States and overwhelmingly negative feel-
ings about Spain’s participation in the Iraq War.
For example, a 2003 telephone survey of 1,204
Spanish nationals aged 18 and above conduct-
ed by Transatlantic Trends and the Barometer
of the Elcano Royal Institute showed that a
majority of respondents (37 percent) regarded
the United States as Spain’s closest friend.
However, a minority (6 percent) considered the
United States more important than Europe to
Spanish foreign policy while 56 percent
answered the opposite — that Europe is more
important than the United States to Spanish
foreign policy. In addition, 76 percent of respon-
dents maintained a negative view of the inter-
national situation, and no fewer than 
85 percent indicated that the Iraq War was not
worth the trouble. Along with France, this is
the highest percentage of popular opposition to
the war in Europe, according to sources at the
Elcano Royal Institute. Despite this result, 
72 percent of respondents indicated that Spain
should continue to play an active role in inter-
national politics.
Just as Gonzalez failed to pay adequate
attention to changing public attitudes about
Europe in the mid-1990s, which partially con-
tributed to his election loss in 1996, Aznar did
not fully consider public attitudes about the
United States or the Iraq War in 2001–2004.
Instead, like Gonzalez, who maintained close
contact to Europe despite popular skepticism
about the EU, Aznar remained staunchly allied
with Bush during the war despite a public that
desired otherwise. As discussed above, chang-
63
ing public attitudes under Gonzalez were large-
ly consistent with Aznar’s perceived policy
approach at election time and subsequently
coincided with the shift in government in 1996.
The same appeared true almost ten years later.
Zapatero’s perceived policy approach, and par-
ticularly his pre-election pledge to withdraw
Spanish troops from Iraq, appeared more con-
sistent with popular attitudes that had changed
under Aznar. And although there is much
debate about reasons for the shift in Spain’s
government that took place in 2004, most
scholars agree that Aznar’s failure to respond
to public attitudes about Iraq contributed, in
part, to his party’s loss.
Zapatero’s Socialist Shift and Its
Implications for the Future of Spain
While it is too soon to determine how the
Spanish public will react to Zapatero’s policy
agenda, or how Spain’s international status and
political clout in Europe will change under
Socialist rule, it is evident that Zapatero’s ini-
tial shift in foreign policy was affected by both
characteristics in ways similar to those that
caused change under Aznar. Like Aznar, who
had assumed power as Spain gained credibility
in international affairs, Zapatero assumed
power in the wake of a second shift in Spain’s
role abroad, which has been marked by the
country’s close relationship with the United
States. Similarly, Zapatero’s election win, like
Aznar’s, has coincided with changing Spanish
attitudes toward Europe, the United States, and
Spain’s relationship to both. Despite these sim-
ilarities, Zapatero’s new policy plan contrasts
with Aznar’s and instead corresponds to party
lines as defined by Gonzalez’s Socialist rule.
For example, within days of his election
win on March 14, 2004, Zapatero announced
plans to reestablish a “magnificent” relation-
ship with France and Germany and pledged that
his government would be “deeply pro-
European.” (EU Business, Mar. 15, 2004) “Our
top priority is to get back into Europe and be at
one with Europe,” said Miguel A. Moratinos, a
member of the advisory committee of the
Secretary General of the PSOE, at a conference
held just days before general elections.
(Moratinos, p. 1) This type of rhetoric mirrors
Gonzalez’s Europeanist approach to policy;
however, because the country’s role in interna-
tional affairs has dramatically changed since
Gonzalez’s rule, Zapatero has the ability to
rekindle Socialist ideals while at the same time
maintain effective authority abroad — author-
ity that was previously unknown to Gonzalez.
In other words, Zapatero can reprioritize rela-
tions with Europe as is characteristic of the
PSOE yet also continue to assert Spanish
authority abroad. This ability is most apparent
in Spain’s potential to play a major role in inter-
national affairs with regard to the future of EU
security and defense.
Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) ter-
rorist attacks in the United States and the
Madrid bombings that took place on March 11,
2004 (3/11), security and defense have become
both inescapable and integral parts of EU poli-
cy development. In the past, the makeup of
most European armed forces reflected decisions
made after the Cold War. At that time, interna-
tional security threats had diminished and
defense budgets generally shifted toward other
societal needs. (Lindley-French, p. 1) In today’s
post-9/11 and post-3/11 world, however, EU
member-states have forcibly made a commit-
ment to the progression of collective defense.
For example, since 9/11, EU initiatives have
included the following: the appointment of a
security coordinator to coordinate the EU’s
efforts against terrorism; the increased
exchange of information among law enforce-
ment authorities; and the creation of a
European CIA made up of an intelligence
agency but no police force. (Montero, pp. 1–2)
Against this background, Spain, led by
Zapatero, is in a position to capitalize on its past
history with terrorism and take a leading role
in contributing to counter-terrorism efforts
within the EU. Since 1959, Spain has been
involved in an ongoing fight against ETA, a
group of Basque separatists who use terror tac-
tics in hopes of forming an independent state.
(“Basque Fatherland …”) The group targets
national and regional officials and government
buildings in Spain, and almost killed Aznar 
in a car-bomb attack in 1995. (“Basque
Fatherland …”) Thus, as a result of its past
experience with ETA, Spain maintains both crit-
ical insight and unique perspective into the
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ist threats. 
Conclusions
Since 1982, four years after the formal
establishment of constitutional democracy in
Spain, Socialist and conservative leaders have
dominated national politics. Felipe Gonzalez,
leader of the PSOE, was first elected in 1982 and
reelected on three subsequent occasions —
1986, 1989, and 1993 — until power shifted
hands in 1996 and conservative leader Jose
Maria Aznar gained rule. Eight years later the
Socialist party regained control, this time under
the leadership of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero.
Changes in foreign policy accompanied each
shift in government and were primarily based
on party identity, international perceptions of
Spain, and popular Spanish attitudes toward
Europe. However, while each of these aspects
consistently affected foreign policy when power
changed hands, the varying characteristics of
each aspect resulted in different policy pursuits
under Gonzalez, Aznar, and Zapatero.
Consequently, whereas Gonzalez had to assume
a large degree of EU policy to gain credibility
abroad, Aznar was able to pursue an agenda
more independent of the EU because Spain had
gained both prestige and a large degree of inter-
national trust by the time he won. Likewise,
whereas popular Spanish perceptions of Europe
gave Aznar reason to pursue stronger ties to the
United States instead of Europe, a shift in these
perceptions consequently gave Zapatero reason
to reestablish ties to the EU. As a result of this
shift and Spain’s increased degree of prestige
abroad, Zapatero has been able to both rekin-
dle Socialist ideals as defined by Gonzalez and
assert Spanish interests abroad as practiced by
Aznar.
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